‘granting of an equal moral status to all living beings’
The subjective recognition of a value is seen by some as anthropocentric, and by that it would not be able to form the basis of an environmental ethic. However, when autonomy is taken as intrinsic value, it will irrefutably involve a subjective perspective, even in the recognizing of one’s own autonomy (Heyd, 2005). The recognizing of one’s self requires the recognizing of someone or something other then one’s self, thereby recognizing the autonomy of the self and other. The recognizing of the other, thus, also necessarily involves recognition of the self.
During the scientific revolution, the original organic view of nature as a community or living organism was replaced with a more mechanistic perspective of nature as a machine (Merchant, 1980). The scientific discoveries that followed, provided ways to control and dominate nature. The original view of nature and Earth as community or organism, had previously aided in a constraining manner on human actions in the relation to their surroundings. The mechanistic and rationalized worldview validates the exploitation of nature, resulting in a dualistic view that sees humans as separate from nature. This perspective results in difficulty to conceive humans and other entities in nature as mutually dependent and limits our ability to view other entities as directly morally considerable.
The use of concepts as nature and non-nature can thus result in a perspective in which the world is divided two categories, one that is the human and can be directly morally considerable, and one that is natural and can be subject to different ethics and can be used to further human ends. This distinction can create the perspective that entities and processes can be perceived as fundamentally distinct from ourselves and our lives, and by that can be seen as merely instrumental to us and devoid of moral consideration. The renouncing of a perspective that endorses such a rigid nature/non-nature dichotomy, could give rise to an ethic that includes direct moral consideration of other entities than humans. These entities can then be seen as part of the same world and therefore subject to the same processes and forces by which they could be attributed a similar moral significance.
As Heyd (2003) argued: “To recognize a being as autonomous is not to deny that every being thrives through interdependence”. Each being’s own autonomous striving to reach it’s potential leads to a web of symbiotic relations that gives rise to ontological dependence and establishes the community of nature.
all organisms share relations with others, and derive their existence from these relations. The relations all entities share, create an intricate web that benefits and gives rise to all entities. Humans, or the species Homo sapiens, also developed as knots in this web and are therefore dependent on and part of these symbiotic relations. Because humans form a part of this web, it is a delusion to divide the world in the categories of nature and non-nature.
The interdependence of different entities and phenomena defines and ensures their existence and has resulted in the species that are alive today. These relations benefit all entities and all entities depend on these relations. The interconnectedness of all entities is the community of nature.
The autonomous striving of humans in the Western view has transcended the symbiotic relations of the community of nature, and by that, it can be the cause of the degradation of nature, which is disadvantageous to humans as well as the rest of the community of nature.
To act in accordance with symbiotic relations and to adopt ethics that promote the autonomy of natural processes, might seem difficult in our current society. Our society is in many ways based on continuous profit maximization and personal gains. In environmental ethics, the ‘environmental pragmatists’ argue that many theoretical ethics, such as described in this thesis, have little effect on policy-making (Palmer, 2003). However, ethics should not solely lead to policies which impose people how to act. The forced adhering to rules created by policy makers will unlikely lead to sincere respecting of nature, and thereby people will always act near the boundaries of these rules to fulfill their personal goals. Instead, the personal conviction that all humans are part of the community of nature would promote prosperity for humans and other beings. This ‘ecological conscience’ as a “a conviction of individual responsibility for the health of the land (Leopold, 1949, p. 45)“, would require new (or renewed) modes of valuing. The current environmental degradation will unlikely be subverted through the implementation of policies and laws. Instead, it calls for a change in each individual’s personal ethic.
Clare Raido 